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Abstract. It is shown that the infinite-valued first-order Go¨del logic
G0 based on the set of truth values {1/k : k ∈ ω \ {0}} ∪ {0} is not r.e.
The logic G0 is the same as that obtained from the Kripke semantics
for first-order intuitionistic logic with constant domains and where the
order structure of the model is linear. From this, the unaxiomatizability
of Kro¨ger’s temporal logic of programs (even of the fragment without
the nexttime operator ©) and of the authors’ temporal logic of linear
discrete time with gaps follows.
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1 Introduction
In [4], Kurt Go¨del introduced a sequence of finite-valued logics Gn in order
to show that there are infinitely many propositional systems intermediate in
strength between classical and intuitionistic propositional logic. In [3], Dummett
considers the natural infinite-valued analogue LC of Go¨del’s systems and shows
that it is axiomatized using the intuitionistic propositional calculus plus the
axiom schema (A ⊃ B) ∨ (B ⊃ A). Little is known about first-order versions of
Dummett’s LC and related systems and about infinite-valued first-order logics in
general. The most famous result (Scarpellini [8]) in this area is that the infinite-
valued first-order  Lukasiewicz logic is not recursively axiomatizable.
We arrive at a first-order Go¨del logic by taking the truth functions for the
propositional connectives and defining truth functions for universal and existen-
tial quantifiers as infimum and supremum over the truth values, respectively. It is
worth pointing out right away that which logic we get depends crucially on the or-
der type of the set of truth values. In Section 2 we define these logics and describe
their differences. The main result of this paper is that a particular Go¨del logic
G0, namely that based on the set of truth values V 0 =
{
1/k : k ∈ ω\{0}}∪{0},
is not recursively axiomatizable. Indeed, already the ∃-free fragment is not r.e.
We give the proof in Section 3.
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The main interest of Dummett’s LC is that it axiomatizes linear intuitionistic
Kripke semantics: LC is the set of all propositional formulas valid in all Kripke
trees consisting of just one branch. We see that there is a strong connection
between infinite-valued Go¨del logic and logics based on linearly ordered models.
In the first-order case it turns out that the logic defined by linearly ordered
Kripke structures and constant domains ILC is exactly the same as G0. The
logic we get by dropping the requirement that the domains are constant, IL, is
arguably the more natural analogue to LC in the first-order case. We obtain the
result that the set of validities of IL is not r.e. as a corollary to the result for
G0 (which is equal to ILC).
Other logics based on linearly ordered Kripke structures are, e.g., variants
of Kro¨ger’s [5] Temporal logic of programs TL. TL is based on the temporal
operators 2 (henceforth) and © (nexttime) and is characterized by temporal
structures order isomorphic to ω. It is known [9, 6, 7] that first-order TL is not
axiomatizable. The logic arising from temporal structures that have the form of
trees of segments each of which is order-isomorphic to ω is axiomatizable [2]. It
has been an open question whether the logic based on chains of segments order-
isomorphic to ω is axiomatizable or not. In Section 4 we use the incompleteness
result to give a negative answer to this question. We also strengthen the result
of [6]: Already first-order TL without © is not axiomatizable.
2 First-order Temporal, Intuitionistic and Go¨del Logics
We shall work in a usual language L of predicate logic containing countably
many variables (x, y, z, . . . ), function symbols (s, h, . . . ), predicate symbols (P ,
Q, R, . . . ), connectives (∧, ∨, ⊃, ¬) and the universal (∀) and existential (∃)
quantifiers. The language L extended by the temporal operators 2 (henceforth
always) and © (next time) is denoted Lt. The set of (closed) formulas of L resp.
Lt is denoted Frm(L) resp. Frm(Lt). For a given interpretation K we will also
consider extended languages LK where the elements of a given domain are added
as constant symbols the interpretation of which is fixed.
We proceed to define Kripke semantics for first-order temporal logics. These
logics are all based on discrete time; this reflects their use in theoretical computer
science where “time” is taken to be the discrete states of program executions
(see [5]).
Definition 21. Let T be a denumerable partially ordered set. T belongs to the
class L of linear discrete orders iff it is order isomorphic to ω; it belongs to the
class T of trees if it is order isomorphic to a rooted tree; it belongs to the class
G of linear discrete orders with gaps if it is order isomorphic to an ω-chain of
ω-segments (i.e., to ω ·ω); it belongs to the class B of linear discrete orders with
branching gaps iff it is order isomorphic to a rooted tree of ω-segments.
Definition 22. Let W be L, G, or B, and let Frm(Lt) be the set of formulas
over some first-order temporal language. A temporal structure K for Lt is a tuple
〈T, {Di}i∈T , {si}i∈T , s〉, where T ∈ W, Di is a set called the domain at state i,
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Di ⊆ Dj if i ≤ j, si is a function mapping n-ary predicate symbols to functions
from Dni to {>,⊥}, and s is a function mapping n-ary function symbols to
functions from
⋃
Di →
⋃
Di s.t. s(f)(d1, . . . , dn) ∈ Di for di ∈ Di, in particular
for d ∈ Di, s(d) = d. The valuation function s can be extended in the obvious
way to a function on all terms.
We define the valuation functions Ki from Frm(LK) to {>,⊥} as follows.
Suppose A ∈ Frm(LK).
(1) A ≡ P (t1, . . . , tn): Ki(A) = si(P )
(
s(t1), . . . , s(tn)
)
(2) A ≡ ¬B: Ki(A) = > if Ki(B) = ⊥, and = ⊥ otherwise.
(3) A ≡ B ∧ C: Ki(A) = > if Ki(B) = Ki(C) = >, and = ⊥ otherwise.
(4) A ≡ B ∨ C: Ki(A) = > if Ki(B) = > or Ki(C) = >, and = ⊥ otherwise.
(5) A ≡ B ⊃ C: Ki(A) = > if Ki(B) = ⊥ or Ki(C) = >, and = ⊥ otherwise.
(6) A ≡ (∀x)B(x): Ki(A) = > if Ki[d/x](A(d)) = > for every d ∈ Di, and = ⊥
otherwise
(7) A ≡ (∃x)B(x): Ki(A) = > if Ki[d/x](A(d)) = > for some d ∈ Di and = ⊥
otherwise
(8) A ≡ 2B: Ki(A) = > if Kj(B) = > for every j ≥ i, and = ⊥ otherwise.
(9) A ≡ ©B: Ki(A) = > if Ki+1(B) = >, and = ⊥ otherwise
A is satisfied in a temporal structure K, K |=t A, iff K0(A) = >.
Definition 23. We define the following logics:
Linear discrete temporal logic TL is the set of all A ∈ Frm(Lt) s.t. K =
〈T, {Di}i∈T , {si}i∈T , s〉 with T ∈ L satisfies A.
Linear discrete temporal logic with constant domains TLC is the set of all A ∈
Frm(Lt)every K = 〈T, {Di}i∈T , {si}i∈T , s〉 with T ∈ L and Di = Dj for all
i, j ∈ T satisfies A.
Linear discrete temporal logic with gaps TG is the set of all A ∈ Frm(Lt) s.t.
K = 〈T, {Di}i∈T , {si}i∈T , s〉 with T ∈ G satisfies A.
Linear discrete temporal logic with gaps and constant domains TGC is the set
of all A ∈ Frm(Lt)every K = 〈T, {Di}i∈T , {si}i∈T , s〉 with T ∈ G and Di =
Dj for all i, j ∈ T satisfies A.
Linear discrete temporal logic with branching gaps TB is the set of all A ∈
Frm(Lt) s.t. K = 〈T, {Di}i∈T , {si}i∈T , s〉 with T ∈ B satisfies A.
As indicated in the introduction, the logic TL is not axiomatizable. This was
shown for the original formulation of Kro¨ger by Szalas [9] and Kro¨ger [6] (two
binary function symbols have to be present for the results to hold). If the operator
until is also present, or if local variables (i.e., variables whose interpretation may
me different for each state) are allowed, then the empty signature suffices, as was
shown by Szalas and Holenderski [10] and Kro¨ger [6], respectively. These results
were strengthened and extended in various ways by Merz [7]. In fact, to be
precise, Kro¨ger’s original formulation TLV differs from TL as defined here in
several respects: it has (1) constant domains, (2) rigid predicate symbols (i.e.,
the interpretation of the predicate symbols is the same for each state) and (3)
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local variables. Merz [7, Lemma 1] shows that the validity problem for TLC can
be reduced to to the validity problem for TLV. Hence, our results extend also
to Kro¨ger’s original formulation. On the other hand, TB is axiomatizable by a
sequent calculus presented in [2].
Next we give Kripke semantics for various fragments of first-order intuition-
istic logic. We use the term “intuitionistic logic” par abus de langage: “Real”
intuitionistic logic is defined not via Kripke- or any other semantics but by Heyt-
ing’s calculi which he extracted from the writings of Brouwer. It is a more recent
discovery that one can give Kripke semantics for these logics which are complete
for the calculi. This completeness result, however, is of doubtful value from the
intuitionistic point of view.
Definition 24. Let Frm(L) be the set of formulas over some first-order lan-
guage, and let T bei in T or L. An intuitionistic Kripke-structure K for L is
a tuple 〈T, {Di}i∈T , {si}i∈T , s〉, where Di is a set called the domain at state i,
Di ⊆ Dj if i ≤ j, si is a function mapping n-ary predicate symbols to functions
from Dni to {>,⊥}, and s is a function mapping n-ary function symbols to func-
tions from
⋃
Di →
⋃
Di s.t. s(f)(d1, . . . , dn) ∈ Di for di ∈ Di, in particular for
d ∈ Di, s(d) = d. The valuation si has to satisfy a monotonicity requirement: if
si(P (d¯)) = > then sj(P (d¯)) = > for all j ≥ i. The valuation function s can be
extended in the obvious way to a function on all terms.
We define the valuation functions Ki from Frm(LK) to {>,⊥} as follows.
Suppose A ∈ Frm(LK).
(1) A ≡ P (t1, . . . , tn): Ki(A) = si(P )
(
s(t1), . . . , s(tn)
)
.
(2) A ≡ ¬B: Ki(A) = > iff Kj(B) = ⊥ for all j ≥ i, and = ⊥ otherwise.
(3) A ≡ B ∧ C: Ki(A) = > iff Ki(B) = Ki(C) = >, and = ⊥ otherwise.
(4) A ≡ B ∨ C: Ki(A) = > iff Ki(B) = > or Ki(C) = >, and = ⊥ otherwise.
(5) A ≡ B ⊃ C: Ki(A) = > iff for all j ≥ i, Kj(B) = ⊥ or Kj(C) = >, and = ⊥
otherwise.
(6) A ≡ (∀x)B(x): Ki(A) = > if Kj [d/x](A(d)) = > for every j ≥ i and every
d ∈ Dj , and = ⊥ otherwise.
(7) A ≡ (∃x)B(x): Ki(A) = > if Ki[d/x](A(d)) = > for some d ∈ Di and = ⊥
otherwise.
A is satisfied in an intuitionistic Kripke structure K, K |=i A, iff K0(A) = >.
Definition 25. We define the following logics:
Intuitionistic logic I is the set of all A ∈ Frm(L) s.t. every K =
〈T, {Di}i∈T , {si}i∈T , s〉 with T ∈ T satisifies A.
Linear intuitionistic logic IL is the set of all A ∈ Frm(L) s.t. every K =
〈T, {Di}i∈T , {si}i∈T , s〉 with T ∈ L satisfies A.
Linear intuitionistic logic with constant domains ILC is the set of all A ∈
Frm(A) s.t. every K = 〈T, {Di}i∈T , {si}i∈T , s〉 with T ∈ L and Di = Dj
for all i, j ∈ T satisfies A.
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As usual, if L is some logic, we write L |= A for A ∈ L.
First-order Go¨del logics are given by a first-order language, truth functions
for the connectives and quantifiers, and a set of truth values. The sets of truth
values for the systems we consider are subsets of [0, 1]; the designated truth value
is 1. The propositional versions of these logics were originally introduced by
Go¨del [4], and have spawned a sizeable area of logical research subsumed under
the title “intermediate logics” (intermediate between classical and intuitionistic
logic).
Interpretations are defined as usual:
Definition 26. Let V ⊆ [0, 1] be some set of truth values which contains 0 and 1
and is closed under supremum and infimum. A many-valued interpretation I =
〈D, s〉 based on V is given by the domain D and the valuation function s where s
maps atomic formulas in Frm(LI) into V and n-ary function symbols to functions
from Dn to D.
s can be extended in the obvious way to a function on all terms. The valuation
for formulas is defined as follows:
(1) A ≡ P (t1, . . . , tn) is atomic: I(A) = s(P )(s(t1), . . . , s(tn)).
(2) A ≡ ¬B:
I(A) =
{
0 if I(B) 6= 0
1 otherwise.
(3) A ≡ B ∧ C: I(A) = min(I(B), I(C)).
(4) A ≡ B ∨ C: I(A) = max(I(A), I(B)).
(5) A ≡ B ⊃ C:
I(A) =
{
I(C) if I(B) > I(C)
1 if I(B) ≤ I(C).
The set {I(A(d)) : d ∈ D} is called the distribution of A(x), we denote it by
DistrI(A(x)). The quantifiers are, as usual, defined by infimum and supremum
of their distributions.
(6) A ≡ (∀x)B(x): I(A) = inf DistrI(B(x)).
(7) A ≡ (∃x)B(x): I(A) = sup DistrI(B(x)).
I satisfies a formula A, I |=m A, if I(A) = 1.
In considering first-order infinite valued logics, care must be taken in choosing
the set of truth values. In order to define the semantics of the quantifier we
must restrict the set of truth values to those which are closed under infima and
suprema. Note that in propositional infinite valued logics this restriction is not
required. For instance, the rational interval [0, 1]∩Q will not give a satisfactory
set of truth values. The following, however, do:
VR = [0, 1]
V 0 =
{
1/k : k ∈ ω \ {0}} ∪ {0}
V 1 =
{
1− 1/k : k ∈ ω \ {0}} ∪ {1}
The corresponding infinite-valued Go¨del logics are GR, G0, and G1.
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Definition 27. GR is the set of all A ∈ Frm(L) s.t. for every I based on VR,
I |=m A.
G0 is the set of all A ∈ Frm(L) s.t. for every I based on V 0, I |=m A.
G1 is the set of all A ∈ Frm(L) s.t. for every I based on V 1, I |=m A.
Note that V 0 is order isomorphic to the set of truth values for LC (ω + 1,
with 0 designated and reverse order); hence G0 is the natural generalization of
LC to first-order. The corresponding propositional systems all have the same
sets of tautologies, as can easily be seen. In other words, propositional infinite-
valued logic is independent of the cardinality or order type of the set of truth
values. The finite-valued versions are all distinct, however, and in fact LC is the
intersection of all finite-valued Go¨del logics.
The first-order infinite-valued systems are not equivalent, however.
Proposition 28. Let
C = (∃x)(A(x) ⊃ (∀y)A(y)) and
C ′ = (∃x)((∃y)A(y) ⊃ A(x))
Then
(1) I(C) = 1 if DistrI(A(x)) has a minimum (w.r.t. I) and = I((∀y)A(y))
otherwise.
(2) I(C ′) = 1 if DistrI(A(x)) has a maximum and = I((∃y)A(y)) otherwise.
Proof. (1) Let us assume that DistrI(A(x)) has the minimum d. I(A(d)) =
I((∀y)A(y)) and therefore I(A(d) ⊃ (∀y)A(y)) = 1 and I(C) = 1. If
DistrI(A(x)) does not have a minimum then I(A(d)) > I((∀y)A(y)) for all
d ∈ D(I) and, by definition of the semantics of ⊃, I(A(d) ⊃ (∀y)A(y)) =
I((∀y)A(y)) for all d ∈ D(I); thus also the supremum I(C) gets this value.
(2) If DistrI(A(x)) has the maximum d then, similarly, I(A(d)) =
I((∃y)A(y)) and I(C ′) = 1. If DistrI(A(x)) does not have a maximum then
we always have I((∃y)A(y)) > I(A(d)) and I((∃y)A(y) ⊃ A(d)) = I(A(d)),
whence I(C ′) = sup DistrI(A(x)) = I((∃y)A(y)). 
Corollary 29. Let C and C ′ be defined as in Proposition 28. Then C ′ is valid
in both G0 and G1. C is valid in G1 but not in G0. Neither C nor C ′ are valid
in GR.
Proof. C ′ is valid in G0 because every supremum is a maximum; it is also
valid in G1 because the only supremum which is not a maximum is 1.
C is not valid in G0 because there exists a sequence of truth values converging
to 0, having no minimum and I((∀y)A(y)) = 0. In G1 every infimum is also a
minimum and thus C is valid in G1.
C and C ′ are both nonvalid in GR because – at arbitrary places in the open
interval (0, 1) there are infinite (increasing and decreasing) sequences without
maximum and minimum. 
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Note that both C and C ′ are valid in classical logic and not valid in intu-
itionistic logic. Dummett’s formula (A ⊃ B) ∨ (B ⊃ A) is also not valid intu-
itionistically, but—of course—it is true in all three infinite-valued Go¨del logics:
Whatever A and B evaluate to, one of them is certainly less than or equal to
the other.
Proposition 210. For any first-order formula A, G0 |= A iff ILC |= A.
Proof. Only if: Let K = 〈ω,D, {si}i∈ω, s〉 be an ILC interpretation. Define the
maps ϕˆK: Frm(LK) → {>,⊥}ω and ϕK: Frm(LK) → V 0 as follows:
ϕˆK(A) = 〈Ki(A)〉i∈ω
ϕK(A) =
{
1/(min{i : Ki(A) = >}+ 1) if Ki(A) = > for some i
0 otherwise
Note that the monotonicity proviso in the definition of ILC-interpretations im-
plies that ϕˆ(A) is of the form {⊥}n_{>}ω for some n ∈ ω, or equals {⊥}ω.
We can now associate to each ILC-interpretation K a many-valued interpreta-
tion IK = 〈D, sK〉 by setting sK(A) = ϕK(A) for A atomic in LK. It is then easily
proved, by induction on the complexity of a formula A, that IK(A) = ϕK(A).
The only nontrivial induction step is that concerning implication. Suppose
IK(A) = ϕK(A), IK(B) = ϕK(B). (IH)
(1) K0(A ⊃ B) = >: By definition of the ILC-semantics we get Ki(A) = ⊥
or Ki(B) = > for all i ∈ ω. Moreover, by definition of ϕK, we have ϕK(A ⊃
B) = 1.
(a) K0(A) = >: By definition of the ILC-semantics, Ki(A) = > for all
i ∈ ω. From K0(A ⊃ B) = > we thus get Ki(B) = > for all i ∈ ω. By
definition of ϕK, ϕK(A) = ϕK(B) = 1 and, by (IH), IK(A) = IK(B) = 1.
So the G0-semantics yields IK(A ⊃ B) = 1.
(b) K0(A) = ⊥: Let mA = min{j : Kj(A) = >}, mB = min{j : Kj(B) =
>}. mA and mB may be undefined. But by K0(A ⊃ B) = > and the
ILC-semantics mB can only be undefined ifmA is too. If both are defined
then mB ≤ mA. By definition of ϕK this gives us ϕK(A) ≤ ϕK(B). (IH)
yields IK(A) ≤ IK(B) and the semantics of G0 that IK(A ⊃ B) = 1.
(2) K0(A ⊃ B) = ⊥: By definition of the ILC-semantics there exists a j ∈ ω
s.t. Kj(A) = > and Kj(B) = ⊥. Let m be the least such. By the ILC-
semantics Kj(A) = > for all j ≥ m and m < min{j : Kj(B) = >} giving
ϕK(B) < ϕK(A). From (IH) we thus derive IK(B) < IK(A) and, by the
semantics of G0, IK(A ⊃ B) = IK(B).
If Kj(B) = ⊥ for all j ∈ ω then, by definition of ϕK, ϕK(A ⊃ B) = ϕK(B) = 0.
From IK(B) = ϕK(B) = 0 we get ϕK(A ⊃ B) = IK(A ⊃ B).
If, on the other hand, Kj(B) = > for some j ∈ ω then ϕK(B) = ϕK(A ⊃ B).
By (IH) we get ϕK(B) = IK(B) and finally ϕK(A ⊃ B) = IK(A ⊃ B). This
concludes the induction step.
It immediately follows that if ILC 6|= A then G0 6|= A.
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If: Conversely, let I = 〈D, s〉 be a G0-interpretation. Let KI =
〈ω,D, {si}i∈ω, s′〉 be given by:
si(A) =
{
> if I(A) ≥ 1i+1⊥ otherwise.
for atomic A, and s′ according to the interpretation of the function symbols in s.
Again by induction on the complexity of formulas we have I(A) = ϕKI(A), in
particular, KI 6|=i A if I 6|=m A. 
3 Incompleteness of G0, ILC and IL
We proceed to prove that the valid formulas of G0are not recursively enumerable.
In contrast to this result, all finite-valued Go¨del logics are r.e. [1] as well as GR
[11] (GR there appears as intuitionistic fuzzy logic).
Proposition 31. Let I be a G0- interpretation, A a formula and
v = I((∀x)¬[A(x) ⊃ (∀y)A(y)])
Then v = 0 if DistrI(A(x)) has a minimum and v = 1 otherwise.
Proof. Just as in Proposition 28: Suppose DistrI(A(x)) has a minimum v,
let d ∈ D be s.t. I(A(d)) = v. Then I(A(d)) = I((∀y)A(y)), so
I(¬[A(d) ⊃ (∀y)A(y)]) = 0. Conversely, if DistrI(A(x)) has no minimum, then
I((∀y)A(y)) = 0 and I(A(d)) > 0 for all d ∈ D. Hence I(A(d) ⊃ (∀y)A(y)) = 0,
and I(¬[A(d) ⊃ (∀y)A(y)]) = 1 for all d ∈ D. 
In order to prove the main theorem of this chapter we need some tools from
recursion theory.
Definition 32. Let ψ be an effective recursive enumeration of the set PR11 of
all primitive recursive functions from ω to ω. We define a two place function ϕ
(which enumerates a subclass of PR11):
ϕk(x) =
0 if x = 00 if ψk(y) = 0 for 1 ≤ y ≤ x1 otherwise
The index set Oϕ is defined as {k : (∀y)ϕk(y) = 0}.
Proposition 33. The index set Oϕ is not recursively enumerable.
Proof. By definition of ϕ, {k : (∀y)ϕk(y) = 0} = {k : (∀y)ψk(y) = 0}. But for
every g ∈ PR11 the index set {k : (∀y)ψk = g} is Π1-complete. Therefore Oϕ is
Π1-complete and thus not recursively enumerable. 
The essence of the incompleteness proof is represented by a sequence of for-
mulas (Ak)k∈ω constructed via ϕ s.t.
G0 |= Ak ⇐⇒ k ∈ Oϕ
i.e. Oϕ is m-reducible to the validity problem of G0.
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Definition 34. Let P be a one-place predicate symbol, s be the function sym-
bol for the successor function and 0¯ be the constant symbol representing 0 (in
particular, we choose a signature containing this symbol and all symbols from
Robinson’s arithmetic Q).
Let A1 be a conjunction of axioms strong enough to represent every recursive
function (e.g. the axioms of Q) and a defining axiom for the function ϕ s.t.
every atomic formula is negated or doubly negated. We define the formulas
A2, A
k
3 , A
k
4 , A
k
5 for k ∈ ω; for formulas representing the equality ϕk(x) = 0 we
write [ϕk(x) = 0].
A2 ≡ (∀x)¬¬P (x)
Ak3 ≡ (∀x, y)(¬[ϕk(x) = 0] ∧ ¬¬x ≤ y ⊃ ¬[ϕk(y) = 0])
Ak4 ≡ (∀x)(¬[ϕk(x) = 0] ⊃ (P (0¯) ⊃ P (x))
Ak5 ≡ (∀x){¬¬[ϕk(s(x)) = 0] ⊃
⊃ [(P (x) ⊃ P (s(x))) ⊃ P (s(x))] ∧ [P (s(x)) ⊃ P (0¯)]}
Finally we set
Bk ≡ A1 ∧A2 ∧Ak3 ∧Ak4 ∧Ak5
and
Ak ≡ Bk ⊃ ((∀x)¬[P (x) ⊃ (∀y)P (y)] ∨ P (0)).
The double negations in Definition 34 serves the purpose of giving classical
truth values to the formulas; note that, for a G0-interpretation I, I(B) > 0
implies I(¬¬B) = 1 (clearly I(B) = 0 implies I(¬¬B) = 0). Therefore the
formulas in A1, A2 and Ak3 may only the receive the truth values 0 and 1 and
thus have a classical meaning. Intuitively A2 expresses that P is always true, A3k
states that ϕk(x) = 0 implies that ϕk(y) = 0 for all y greater than x. Ak4 and A
k
5
are not classical in the sense that they may assume truth values between 0 and
1. I(Ak4) = 1 means (according to the ⊃-semantics of G0) that for all x with
ϕk(x) 6= 0, I(P (0)) is less or equal to I(P (x)).
Lemma 35. If I is a G0-interpretation s.t. I(Bk) < 1, then I(Ak) = 1.
Proof.
(1) I(A1∧A2∧Ak3∧Ak4) < 1: If I(A1∧A2∧Ak3) < 1 then the value is actually 0
and thus I(Bk) = 0; I(Ak) = 1 is a trivial consequence. If I(A1∧A2∧Ak3) = 1
and I(Ak4) < 1 then there must be some d s.t. I(¬[ϕk(d) = 0]) = 1 and
I(P (0¯) ⊃ P (d)) < 1. But then, by the semantics of G0, I(P (d)) ≤ (P (0¯)).
Therefore I(Ak4) ≤ I(P (0¯)) and also I(Bk) ≤ I(P (0¯)). But P (0¯) occurs
disjunctively in Ak and so I(Ak) = 1.
(2) I(A1 ∧ A2 ∧ Ak3 ∧ Ak4) = 1: If I(P (0¯)) = 1 then clearly I(Ak) = 1. Thus
let us assume that I(P (0¯)) < 1. As I(Bk) < 1 we must have I(Ak5) < 1.
That means there exists some d s.t. I(¬¬[ϕk(s(d)) = 0]) = 1 and
I(((P (d) ⊃ P (s(d))) ⊃ P (s(d))) ∧ (P (s(d)) ⊃ P (0¯))) < 1. (∗)
9
For such a d we either have (I(P (d)) ≤ I(P (s(d))) and I(P (s(d))) < 1)
or I(P (0¯)) < I(P (s(d))). In the latter case we get I(P (s(d)) ⊃ P (0¯)) =
I(P (0¯)). Thus in any case (∗) gets a value ≤ I(P (0¯)) and I(Bk) ≤ I(P (0¯)).
Again we obtain I(Ak) = 1. 
Theorem 36. The ∃-free fragment of G0is not recursively enumerable.
Proof. We show that G0 |= Ak iff k ∈ Oϕ (i.e. iff for all x, ϕk(x) = 0). The
sequence (Ak)k∈ω is ∃-free and (trivially) r.e. Thus a recursive enumeration of
all Ak with G0 |= Ak would give a recursive enumeration of the set Oϕ which,
by Proposition 33, does not exist.
Now let us assume that G0 |= Ak. We define a specific G0-interpretation Nk:
The domain of Nk is the set of natural numbers ω and the evaluation function s
for the atoms is defined by:
s(P (sn(0¯))) =
{
1
n+2 if ϕk(n) = 0
1 if ϕk(n) > 0
For all other atoms A we set s(A) = 1 if N |= A and s(A) = 0 otherwise (N |= A
means that A is true in the standard model N). Note that P (0¯) receives the
value 12 .
By definition of Nk all conjuncts of Bk are verified and so Nk(Bk) = 1. By
G0 |= Ak we must have Nk |=m Ak and therefore
Nk |=m (∀x)¬[P (x) ⊃ (∀y)P (y)] ∨ P (0¯).
From Nk(P (0¯)) = 12 we infer
Nk |=m (∀x)¬[P (x) ⊃ (∀y)P (y)].
By Proposition 31 the last property only holds if DistrNk(P (x)) does not have
a minimum.
We show now that ϕk must be the constant function 0. We assume that there
exists a number r s.t. ϕk(r) 6= 0 and derive a contradiction: By definition of s we
obtain s(P (sr(0¯))) = 1. But Nk |=m Ak3 what implies that for all number terms
(i.e. successor terms) sp(0¯) with p ≥ r the formula ¬[ϕk(sp(0¯)) = 0] evaluates
to 1. As A1 represents ϕ we obtain ϕk(p) 6= 0 for all p ≥ r and, by definition of
ϕk, ϕk(p) = 1 for all p ≥ r. By definition of s we thus obtain
s(P (sp(0¯))) = 1 for all p ≥ r
But Nk(P (0¯)) = 12 and, consequently, for almost all p Nk(P (s
p(0¯))) > 12 . There-
fore DistrNk(P (x)) has a minimum; a contradiction. Note that by the choice
of the standard model N we only have standard elements in our domain (i.e.
elements which are represented by successor terms). So there cannot be another
sequence in the set DistrNk(P (x)) which converges to 0. We infer that ϕk must
be identical to 0, and so k ∈ Oϕ.
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For the other direction let us assume that k ∈ Oϕ, i.e. ϕk(n) = 0 for all n. As
A1 represents ϕ the formula [ϕk(s`(0)) = 0] is provable for all ` ∈ ω. Now let I be
an arbitrary G0-interpretation of Ak. If I(Bk) < 1 then, by Lemma 35, I(Ak) =
1. Thus it remains to investigate the case I(Bk) = 1. By definition ofBk, I(Bk) =
1 implies I(Ak5) = 1. We substitute all ground terms s
n(0¯) into the matrix of Ak5 .
These instances are true in I either if all P (sn(0¯)) evaluate to 1 (in which case
Ak is true because also P (0¯) is true) or the sequence I(P (sn(0¯))n∈ω is strictly
decreasing. In the last case the sequence must converge to 0. By the axiom A2 no
element of this sequence is actually = 0; this property also holds for all (potential)
nonstandard elements, which may be present as the domain is arbitrary. As a
consequence DistrI(P (x)) does not have a minimum. Proposition 31 then implies
that
I |=m (∀x)¬[P (x) ⊃ (∀y)P (y)].
But the last formula occurs disjunctively in the consequent of Ak and thus
I |=m Ak. Putting things together we see that Ak evaluates to 1 under all G0-
interpretations, i.e., G0 |= Ak. 
Corollary 37. (1) ILC is not recursively enumerable.
(2) IL is not recursively enumerable.
Proof. (1) Immediate by Proposition 210.
(2) We show: IL |= Ak iff ϕk(n) = 0 for all n. If ϕk(n) 6= 0 for some n, then
G0 6|= Ak by Theorem 36. Since G0 = ILC, there is some ILC-interpretation K
s.t. K 6|=i Ak; but K is also an IL-interpretation, so IL 6|= Ak.
So suppose that ϕk(n) = 0 for all n ∈ ω. Let K = 〈ω, (Di)i∈ω, {si}i∈ω, s〉 be
an IL–interpretation. Then, by definition of the formulas Ak and Bk, K0(Bk) =
⊥ implies K0(Ak) = >. It remains to investigate the case K0(Bk) = >.
All domains Di of K must contain the interpretation of the number terms
sn(0¯). Therefore either K0(P (0¯)) = >, in which case K0(Ak) = 1 by definition of
Ak, or (by the proof of Theorem 36) the sequence ϕK(P (sn(0¯)))n∈ω is strictly
decreasing. Note that we may define ϕK and ϕˆK exactly like in Proposition 210
(although K need not be an ILC–interpretation).
So let us assume that ϕK(P (sn(0¯)))n∈ω is strictly decreasing. We will
show that ϕˆK((∀x)P (x)) = {⊥}ω. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that
ϕˆK((∀x)P (x)) 6= {⊥}ω, i.e. there exists an i ∈ ω s.t. Ki((∀x)P (x)) 6= ⊥. As
(∀x)P (x) does not contain function symbols, Ki((∀x)P (x)) cannot be undefined
and so Ki((∀x)P (x)) = >. By definition of the IL-semantics this implies that
for all j ≥ i and d ∈ Dj , Kj(P (d/x)) = >. In particular, we get
for all d ∈ Di : Ki(P (d/x)) = >.
As Di contains the interpretation of all number terms we also obtain
Ki(P (sn(0¯))) = > for all n ∈ ω. Consequently min{j : Kj(P (sn(0¯))) = >} ≤ i
for all n ∈ ω. By definition of ϕK we thus obtain
ϕK(P (sn(0¯))) ≥ 1
i+ 1
for all n ∈ ω
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and
ϕK(P (sn(0¯))) =
1
kn + 1
for kn ∈ ω, kn ≤ i, n ∈ ω.
This however contradicts our assumption that the sequence ϕK(P (sn(0¯)))n∈ω
is strictly decreasing. So we obtain ϕˆK((∀x)P (x)) = {⊥}ω. However, there are
no i and d ∈ Di s.t. Ki(P (d/x)) = ⊥, since K0((∀x)¬¬P (x)) = > by A2 in
Bk. Therefore Ki(P (d/x) ⊃ (∀y)P (y)) = ⊥ for all i ∈ ω and d ∈ Di. By the
semantics of IL this implies
K0((∀x)¬[P (x) ⊃ (∀y)P (y)]) = >.
But then K0(Ak) = > and the reduction of Oϕ to IL is completed. 
4 Incompleteness of temporal logics
We now proceed to show that (a) ©-free TL and TLC and (b) TG and TGC are
also not recursively axiomatizable. This strengthens the incompleteness result
for TL of Szalas and Kro¨ger [6] and answers a question left open in [2]. In
contrast to TG, however, TB is r.e. [2]. An axiomatization is given by adding
to first-order S4 the axioms:
©(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (©A ⊃ ©B)
¬©A↔ ©¬A
©2A ∧A↔ 2A
and the rule A/©A.
Definition 41. We define the operator Ψ as follows:
Ψ(A) = 2A A atomic
Ψ(A ∨B) = Ψ(A) ∨ Ψ(B)
Ψ(A ∧B) = Ψ(A) ∧ Ψ(B)
Ψ(A ⊃ B) = 2[Ψ(A) ⊃ Ψ(B)]
Ψ(¬A) = 2(¬Ψ(A))
Ψ((∀x)A(x)) = 2(∀x)Ψ(A(x))
Proposition 42. Let A be an ∃-free first-order formula. Then
(1) TL |= Ψ(A) iff IL |= A and
(2) TLC |= Ψ(A) iff ILC |= A.
Proof. Suppose IL 6|= A, let K = 〈ω,Di, {si}, s〉 be a countermodel. We can
interpret K as a TL-interpretation Kt. By induction on the complexity of a
formula A and using the monotonicity property of K we have Kti(Ψ(A)) = Ki(A).
Hence, Kt 6|=t Ψ(A).
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Conversely, let Kt = 〈ω,Di, {sti}, s〉 be a TL-interpretation s.t. Kt 6|=t Ψ(A).
Then define K = 〈ω,Di, {si}, s〉 by si(A) = Kti(2(A)). Again, by an easy induc-
tion on the complexity of A we have Kti(Ψ(A)) = Ki(A). Thus, K 6|=i A.
Similarly, for TLC and ILC. 
Corollary 43. The ∃- and ©-free fragments of TL are not r.e.
Proof. By Corollary 37 and Proposition 42. 
The reader will note the similarity between the above embedding of IL in TL
with Go¨del’s, and McKinsey and Tarski’s embeddings of intuitionistic predicate
logic into S4.
In contrast to first order TL, propositional TL is axiomatizable (even
with ©). In [5] it is shown that we get TLprop by adding to TBprop the rule
A ⊃ B A ⊃ ©B
A ⊃ 2B
Definition 44. The set S∗(A) of strict subformulas of a formula A is defined
as follows:
S∗(A) = {A} ∪
S
∗(B) if A ≡ ¬B
S∗(B) ∪ S∗(C) if A ≡ B ∧ C, B ∨ C, or B ⊃ C
S∗(B(x)) if A ≡ (∀x)B(x) or (∃x)B(x)
Let P1, . . . , Pm be the predicate symbols with occurring in A with arities
r1, . . . , rm and x¯r1 , . . . , x¯rm corresponding variable vectors. Then we define
S(A) = S∗(A) ∪ {Pi(x¯ri) : i = 1, . . . ,m}
Definition 45. Let A be a first-order formula without ∃. Define
CA ≡ 2
∧
B(x¯)∈S(A)
(∀x¯)(B(x¯) ↔ ©B(x¯))
Let TG∗ be the logic based on TG-interpretations where the domains within
an ω-sequence are equal, i.e., for all i, j we have Di·ω+j = Di·ω.
Proposition 46. Suppose A is ©- and ∃-free. Then TG |= CA ⊃ A iff TG∗ |=
CA ⊃ A.
Proof. Only if: Immediate. If: Let K be a TG-interpretation s.t. K 6|=t CA ⊃
A. Let K∗ = 〈D∗i , s∗i 〉 be defined by D∗i·ω+j = Di·ω and s∗i = si |\ D∗i . We
prove by induction on the complexity of A(c¯) (for c¯ ∈ D∗i·ω) that Ki·ω+j(A) =
K∗i·ω+j(A). This is immediately seen for A atomic or with outermost logical
symbol a propositional connective. If A ≡ (∀x)B(x) we argue as follows: Let
(i, j) denote i · ω + j. If Ki,j(A) = > then Ki,j(B(d)) = > for all d ∈ Di,j ⊇ Di,0.
By induction hypothesis, K∗i,j(B(d)) = > for all d ∈ D∗i,j , so K∗i,j(A) = >.
13
If Ki,j(A) = ⊥ then for some d ∈ Di,j , Ki,j(B(d)) = ⊥. Suppose for all
d ∈ Di,0, Ki,j(B(d)) = >. Then we have Ki,0((∀x)©jB(x)∧¬©j(∀x)B(x)) = >.
Since we have Ki,0 |= (∀x)(B(x) ↔ ©B(x)) and Ki,0 |= (∀x)B(x) ↔ ©(∀x)B(x))
this gives Ki,0 |= (∀x)B(x)∧¬(∀x)B(x), a contradiction. Hence actually there is
d ∈ Di,0 s.t. Ki,j(B(d)) = ⊥. By induction hypothesis, K∗i,j(B(d)) = ⊥ = K∗i,j(A).

Let TG∗∗ (TGC∗∗) be the logic based on TG(TGC)-interpretations where
the worlds within an ω-sequence are equal, i.e., for all i, j we have Di,j = Di,0
and si,j = si,0.
Proposition 47. Let A be a © and ∃-free formula.
(1) TGC∗ |= CA ⊃ A iff TGC∗∗ |= CA ⊃ A.
(2) TG∗ |= CA ⊃ A iff TG∗∗ |= CA ⊃ A.
Proof. Obvious, since A does not contain ©. 
Proposition 48. Let A be an ©- and ∃-free formula.
(1) TGC∗∗ |= CA ⊃ A iff TLC |= A.
(2) TG∗∗ |= CA ⊃ A iff TL |= A.
Proof. (1) Only if: Suppose TLC 6|= A, let K = 〈ω,D, {si}, s〉 be a counter-
model. Define Kg = 〈ω ·ω,D, {sgi }i∈ω·ω, s〉 by sgj,k = sj where i, j, k ∈ ω. Clearly,
Kg 6|=t CA ⊃ A.
If: Suppose TGC∗∗ 6|= CA ⊃ A, let K = 〈ω ·ω,D, {si}, s〉 be a countermodel.
Since K |= CA and the domains are constant, Kj,k(A) = Kj,`(A) for A, and in
particular sj,k = sj,`. Define K` = 〈ω,D, {s`i}, s〉 by s`j = sjω for j ∈ ω. Again
by induction on the complexity of A it is easily shown that K`j(A) = K
`
j,k(A). So
K` 6|=t A.
(2) Similarly. 
Corollary 49. The ∃-free fragments of TG and TGC are not r.e.
Proof. By Corollary 43 and Propositions 46, 47 and 48. 
For an axiomatization of the propositional logic TGprop it is convenient to
introduce a new connective 4 defined by Ki,j(4A) = 1 iff Ki+1,0(A) = 1. Then
TGprop is axiomatized by S4 plus
©(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (©A ⊃ ©B) 4(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (4A ⊃ 4B)
©¬A↔ ¬©A 4¬A↔ ¬4A
©4A↔4A ©2A ∧42A ∧A↔ 2A
and the rules
A
©A
A
4A
A ⊃ B A ⊃ ©A A ⊃ 4A
A ⊃ 2B
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5 Conclusion
We used the main result of this paper, the incompleteness of the infinitely valued
first-order Go¨del logic based on the domain of truth values V0 : {1/k : k ≥
1}∪{0}, to demonstrate the incompleteness of first-order discrete linear temporal
logics with/without time gaps and with/without constant domains. The first-
order discrete branching time logic with time gaps, however, is complete, but it
is an open question whether the same applies for the same logic with constant
domains. The infinitely valued first-order Go¨del logics define another field of
future research; we conjecture that the logic based on V1 = {1−1/k : k ≥ 1}∪{1}
and the ∃-fragment of the Go¨del logic based on V0 are recursively axiomatizable.
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